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Opening Remarks 
I am grateful for this opportunity to address you. You may 
recall that the last external program review (EPR) for IFPRI made two 
recommendations that provide the basis for this address. First, it 
recommended that the director of IFPRI should address the Group 
biennially on a policy issue of relevance to the Group. This will be 
the third occasion for me to do so. Second, the EPR urged the 
director of IFPRI to consider extrapolations, from the factual base of 
IFPRI research as well as that of others, in order to draw conclusions 
of immediate relevance to the complex food policy problems facing our 
society. The need for such extrapolation continues to rule. While 
our knowledge of policy processes increases year by year, it seems 
that the complexity and the dynamism of those policy problems changes 
even more rapidly. Hence, the need for policy recommendations seems 
continually to run ahead of the factual basis for making those recom- 
mendations. 
The last time I had the opportunity to address you, we were faced 
with global food surpluses and overflowing stocks, many previously 
importing deve'loping countries were exporting, and there were 
pressures from many directions to reduce expenditure on agricultural 
research and agricultural development generally. 
I tried on that occasion to indicate the complexity of the policy 
problems that had to be solved if those plentiful harvests were to be 
used effectively to foster economic growth of the type that would lift 
the mass of people out of poverty. Since then, a number of developing 
countries have reverted to cereal imports, global stocks have been 
drawn down considerably, and substantial quantities of land in the 
United States are being returned to agriculture. 
In this context, I would like to remark once again on the central 
role of food and agriculture in a strategy of development that 
produces high rates of growth and broad participation in those 
processes. It is the implementation of steady agricultural develop- 
ment policies that stimulates, directly or indirectly, rapid growth in 
effective demand for food on the part of low-income people. Effective 
pursuit of such policies typically results in demand for food increas- 
ing more rapidly than even an excellent record in production, thereby 
creating growth in food markets for the surplus-food-producing 
* Address presented at International Centers Week of the Consul- 
tative Group on International Agricultural Research, Washington, D.C., 
November 4, 1988, 
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOFYKNT OPPORTUNITIES, Page 2 
countries. Thus the slowing of growth in the 1980s has been unfor- 
tunate not only for the poor in developing countries, but for deve- 
loped country exporters as well. 
I see the 1990s as a decade of grand opportunities, following the 
difficult, depressing 1980s. It is worrisome that expenditures on 
agricultural research and irrigation investment have been declining in 
recent years (the latter dropped by half in the past decade in Asia). 
This puts into question whether poverty abatement and growth poten- 
tials will be reached. 
Today, however, I would like to depart from the pessimism of the 
recent past and instead look ahead to a 1990s of grand opportunity. 
To do so, I must first be convincing that the 1960s and 1970s provide 
a clearer picture of what might occur in the 1990s than do the 
distorted, malfunctioning 1980s. I must then discuss the interaction 
of five elements in the 1990s -- poverty reduction, environment, food- 
cost reduction, trade, and stability. This is a lot to cover in a few 
minutes, but the interaction of the five is important and agricultural 
research and the CGIAR’s role in it will be central to grasping 
opportunities offered. 
The 1980s as an Aberration 
The interacting effects of the second oil shock, the rapid growth 
in Third World debt, high real interest rates, unusually depressed 
primary commodity prices, increasingly distorted prices within many 
developing countries, and grossly unbalanced public budgets charac- 
terized the early to mid-1980s. The consequent need for major 
restructuring of policies and economies slowed growth in both deve- 
loped and developing countries (Table 1). 
The slower growth in developed countries further slowed trade 
potentials for developing countries, The results were additional 
reduction in growth in the Third World, much less progress in poverty 
reduction, and consequently diminished growth in demand for food. The 
latter, of course, provided an illusion of food self-sufficiency in 
many developing countries and added to surplus production capacity in 
developed countries. The consequences were most severe in Africa, 
where a poorly developed capacity for policy analysis and ill- 
considered foreign assistance policies compounded the underlying 
problems, and in Latin America where the debt crisis took on parti- 
cularly enormous proportions, 
Current pessimism arises from two sources: observation of the 
distorted 1980s and a view that growth in developing countries is 
driven by import demand of the developed countries whose own growth is 
now permanently slowed by maturity. A different view arises if growth 
is seen as largely the product of technological development that 
raises factor productivity, which in turn is the product of growth of 
human capital and the institutions that mobilize that human capital 
for productive purposes. Throughout the distorted 198fls, as in prior 
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decades, human capital stock has been growing rapidly, even in Africa, 
and institutional structures have also been improving. Thus the 
underlying basis for growth is more developed as we enter the 1990s 
than it was in the late 1960s and 1970s. However, for that growth to 
be driven by domestic demand and for capital resources to be spread 
thinly over a large, growing labor force requires, far more than in 
the past, that effective demand must rise from a technologically 
advancing, cost-reducing development of the agricultural sector. 
The prospect of growth offers extraordinary opportunities for 
reducing hunger and poverty and reversing the current onslaught on the 
environment. It does require cost-reducing technological change and 
open-trading regimes. It also requires that we directly confront the 
problem of increasing instability in global agriculture. I comment 
below on each of these five areas of opportunities and problems for 
the 1990s: hunger, environment, cost reduction, trade, and stability. 
Abolishing Hunger 
The 1990s can be a decade in which major strides made in abolish- 
ing hunger will clearly indicate its approaching end. For that to 
occur, a few key points must be central in our minds. 
Hunger is a massive problem. We will enter the 1990s with at 
least 700 million hungry people by even the most minimal definition of 
food adequacy. A more humane definition would include a full one 
billion people. 
Moreover, the poor are heavily concentrated in the rural areas of 
very low-income countries, and many are in rural areas where the 
potential for response to improved agricultural technology is high. 
Two-thirds of the poor are in Africa and South Asia; three-quarters 
are in low-income developing countries, and only one-quarter are in 
the middle-income countries (Table 2). The hungry poor are dispropor- 
tionately children. And, although in general they appear not to be 
disproportionately in female-headed households, women have an 
influence on nutritional and health status far greater than their 
proportions among the poor. 
Because the problem of poverty is so massive and the poor are so 
concentrated in the rural areas of low-income countries, it is 
difficult to envision eliminating the bulk of hunger through redistri- 
bution. Such redistribution would have to be substantially inter- 
national and would have to grow enormously over time as the number of 
poor in the very poor, slow-growth countries continued to increase 
rapidly, as has been the case in the past. The reasons for these are 
twofold: poor countries have difficulty finding the resources to 
reduce poverty, and the proportion of their population that is poor is 
very large. 
While radically reducing the numbers of poor purely through 
unending international redistribution seems unlikely, reducing their 
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numbers through growth is highly effective. Note that in the middle- 
income developing countries, the absolute number of poor dropped 
nearly in half from 1970 to 1980, while in the low-income countries 
the numbers increased by more than half (Table 3). In regional terms, 
it is the countries of Africa and South Asia in which poverty 
increased greatly in absolute numbers. 
But there is a more important, although still controversial: 
reason to emphasize growth as a means of radically reducing poverty. 
We return here again to the fact that a large number of the poor in 
low-income countries, some 250 million, are located in areas that we 
know are highly responsive to modern, production-increasing techno- 
logy, for which the emplo Y 
agriculture and as well 
(Table 4). For example, in 
than one-quarter of the 
densities; in Kenya, two-th 
districts characterized by 
the middle-income develop 
ment multipliers are substantial within 
as in the rural nonagricultural sector 
India, over half the poor are in the less 
area with the highest rural population 
rds of the poor are in three western 
high population density. In contrast, in 
ng countries, the bulk of poverty has 
already been removed, largely by growth in the high-potential areas. 
To emphasize the areas with high agricultural potential is not to 
ignore the other two-thirds. It is, however, to note that we now know 
what to do to rapidly eliminate hunger in the high potential areas; 
that more than a quarter of the hungry are in urban areas, for which 
vigorous growth in high potential rural areas is critical to reducing 
the pressures of urban poverty to manageable proportions; and, that 
the historical answer to problems of low-potential areas has always 
contained a major element of migration, which in turn depends on good 
performance in the high potential areas and their urban enclaves. I 
will return to the problems of the low-potential areas in a moment. 
What is needed to move the high-potential areas? We now know 
that modern high-yielding agricultural technology is the key. This 
technology in turn is dynamic, requiring continuous effort; it is 
location specific, requiring a large dispersed effort; and it is 
complex, requiring effort on a wide front from research to input 
supply. The quarter of a billion hungry people in high-potential 
areas still lack adequate research and technology support suited to 
their specific conditions and circumstances. The CGIAR has much left 
to do for these areas in association with national systems of research 
and other structures of technological change. That research gap is 
notable in the Gangetic and Brahmaputra Plains in Asia and in the 
higher potential areas throughout Africa. Of course, the lack of 
appropriate technology interacts with other forces in explaining the 
lack of progress -- that is what makes the challenge. 
The other broad category of need that we now know is critical to 
eliminating hunger and extreme poverty from high-potential areas is 
roads and other infrastructure that allow the technology to spread to 
all farmers and allows the employment multipliers to work to make 
adequate jobs for the poor. An IFPRI study in Bangladesh found that 
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areas with good infrastructure used four percent more labor per 
hectare than areas with poor infrastructure and 92 percent more 
fertilizer. The linkage effects of that growth produced a level of 
nonagricultural employment that was 30 percent higher than in the poor 
infrastructure areas and wage rates that were 12 percent higher. 
Infrastructure investment provides the link between long term, 
self-reliant removal of poverty, and short-term amelioration. Rural 
public works provide massive increases in immediate employment and are 
clearly the most proven, targeted means of redistribution of food and 
income to the poor. Fifteen billion dollars a year, about one-quarter 
in food aid, built up over a five year period and continued for 
another 10 or 15 years would provide near immediate relief for the 
bulk of the rural poor in the developing countries. This in conjunc- 
tion with improved agricultural technology would provide employment 
multipliers that would sustain that income increase and access to 
food. 
It should be noted that for such an effort to be properly growth- 
oriented, the resources for rural r-oads and other elements of infra- 
structure must fulfill their development function. Unfortunately, at 
present such efforts are driven so much by immediate employment 
objectives that they fail to provide the larger permanent employment 
multiplier of which they are capable. Projects that build unpaved 
roads that wash away quickly, for example, are clearly insufficient. 
Additional resources are needed. Thus, the food component for labor, 
which currently dominates the total cost of these projects, should 
drop to between 15 and 40 percent of total cost, so that there can be 
additional funds for materials. But more important, there must be 
coordination of food/employment programs and development programs in 
both national governments and international agencies, something which 
is usually lacking in both. 
What about the low-potential areas? They, of course, contain a 
major proportion of the poor in the low-income countries and are the 
dominant reservoir of poverty in the middle-income countries. The 
preceding discussion has indicated that efforts in these areas should 
not be pursued in the low-income countries at the expense of the high- 
potential areas if the objective is to obtain maximum reduction in 
poverty per financial unit of expenditure and unit of time. This 
inevitably means that, in poor countries, large-scale foreign assis- 
tance is needed. And such assistance is important in the middle- 
income countries for reducing diversion from the growth that is itself 
part of the long-term solution for low-potential areas. Note in this 
context that in the middle-income developing countries, little poverty 
remains in high-potential rural areas and that poverty declined 
rapidly in absolute numbers in periods of economic growth (Tables 3 
and 4). Increasing numbers in absolute poverty is a characteristic of 
low-income countries with a high proportion of poor in high-potential 
areas. 
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES, Page 6 
What does one concentrate on in low-potential areas? We know 
much less about this. The most we know is that there is little 
difference in emphasis in low-potential areas and in high-potential 
areas, but the risks are higher and the returns lower. There needs to 
be research focused on breakthroughs that will make these areas high 
potential, with relatively more emphasis on low-cost innovation. 
Infrastructure must be developed to deal with instability through 
market integration and to attain employment multipliers; and, educa- 
tion must be expanded. Massive rural public works can deal with the 
short-run problem in a redistributive manner, while increasing the 
potential for growth. But the difficult task of improving agricul- 
tural technology is central to any possibility of dealing with the 
problems in these areas through internal growth. And precisely 
because these are long-term, high- risk investments, it is appropriate 
that foreign aid and international programs pay for a disproportionate 
share. 
Preserving the Environment 
The solutions to hunger and poverty are very much at the core of 
the solution to the environmental assault occurring in developing 
countries. Of course, environmental degradation occurs in both 
developing and developed countries. But a broad distinction can be 
made. In developed countries environmental destruction is primarily a 
product of wealth, while that in very poor countries is primarily a 
product of poverty. The most serious environmental destruction in 
developing countries occurs as population pressure expands against a 
limited land resource base and pushes cultivation out onto more 
fragile resources. 
We see the complex ramifications of population pressure within 
the context of technological advances dramatically illustrated in an 
IFPRI study on Nepal. In less than a decade, the destruction of 
forest resources has added one-hour per day to the time required for 
women to collect firewood. Deforestation also contributes to a 
decline in the nutritional status of children through the reduced 
cooking time available and reduced time of the mother for preparation 
of food. As women put more time into gathering firewood, they also 
have less time for cultivation. 
In addition, declining productivity of the land from increased 
cultivation in marginal areas encourages more extensive cultivation 
and further clearing of the land. In other words, the degradation of 
forest areas is leading to further degradation of the land, which adds 
to the degradation of the forest areas. There is a clear downward 
spiral in this situation. And it is made more difficult by recurring 
scarcities of food and higher prices. 
There are two solutions to these environmental problems. First, 
increase the agricultural capacity of the less fragile land to help 
relieve the pressure in the more fragile areas. This will produce a 
synergism between environmental preservation and a major attack on 
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poverty in the more responsive areas. Second, conduct research and 
provide infrastructure in the more fragile areas. The former to help 
find less destructive systems of farming, the latter to relieve the 
environmental stress from hunger in years of poor production and by 
increasing nonfarm jobs. Again, we find a synergism between hunger 
abatement through growth and environmental protection. 
Reduced Cost of Production 
The original momentum of the green revolution is running out. 
Food self-sufficiency is waning. In part, the latter is good because 
it reflects accelerating demand for food rather than slowing produc- 
tion growth rates. But, in part, it reflects a slackening of research 
and investment effort resulting in a return to food production 
increases that can only be obtained through rising prices and rising 
costs. This hurts poverty alleviation because of the loss of the 
employment multiplier from the potential savings from new, cost- 
reducing technology. 
Thus we see a need for redoubled effort to increase agricuftural 
productivity. In Africa, of course, such technological breakthroughs 
have hardly occurred. The World Bank MADIA study shows that in Africa 
the proportion of output coming from poor, environmentally fragile 
areas is increasing -- the antipathy of the case for technologically- 
led development -- while in Asia the proportion of total food produc- 
tion occurring in the already high-yield areas has grown rapidly. But 
in Indonesia, the growth rate in cereals production has dropped drama- 
tically. When and from where are the new IR8s and the Sonora 64s to 
come? Have we aligned our resources to provide them? Poverty 
alleviation and environmental protection both require that we return 
to these questions in the 1990s. Our greater human resource capacity 
should allow this and new initiatives as well. 
Trade 
With few exceptions, development cannot be led by export growth 
in the sense that the bulk of the demand for increased output from a 
developing country will come from abroad. Development must be largely 
driven by growth in the domestic demand of developing countries. To 
provide that effective demand for overall growth is the principal 
function of agricultural growth through cost-decreasing technological 
change. That is the proper engine of growth -- not the markets in 
some distant countries that some would suggest. 
Nevertheless, trade is extremely important to the development 
process. Most obviously, we know that once countries accelerate their 
growth substantially, even their best efforts in their agricultural 
sector cannot keep up with the domestic growth in demand for food. 
This is true at least as long as their low-income consumers are 
spending 60 to 80 percent of increments to income on agricultural 
commodities. Thus trade is needed to facilitate the import of basic 
food staples, including cereals and vegetable oils, into developing 
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countries. These countries, of course, must be able to export in 
order to pay for those commodities. 
Equally important, if developing countries are to grow rapidly, 
they must spread their own capital resources across a high proportion 
of their labor force. This means they cannot concentrate on capital- 
intensive industries like steel, petrochemicals and fertilizer. They 
must import those capital-intensive goods and services. And again, 
they must be able to export something to pay for those imports. 
Agriculture, itself, can play an important role in meeting export 
needs. The opportunities are particularly great in labor-intensive 
agricultural commodities like fruit, vegetables, and certain types of 
livestock commodities. The message for research is clear. While we 
are striving for new breakthroughs in the basic food staples, new 
efforts must be added in the labor-intensive agricultural commodities 
for which demand is still growing even in developed countries. 
four lessons from the past can guide us in these important trade 
issues of the 1990s. First, developing countries are already increas- 
ing their share of the international market for labor-intensive 
agricultural commodities and command between a third and half of that 
market already. Second, even as countries move into middle-income 
status, agricultural exports dominate the exports of developing 
countries, hence continued growth in exports requires growth in 
agricultural exports. Third, developing countries do best in labor- 
intensive agricultural exports when their own markets for those 
commodities are growing rapidly. Thus broad-based internal markets 
that derive from successful rural development strengthen agricultural 
trade performance. Fourth, a strong research effort is needed both in 
production to reduce costs and in marketing if new export markets are 
to develop. 
What is the trade lesson for the CG system? First, it is that we 
should stick to our areas of demonstrated expertise -- alternative 
efforts are to little avail if the basic agricultural sector is not 
moving ahead. Second, we should broaden our efforts, as resources 
allow, doing so in the direction of labor-intensive agricultural 
commodities, such as horticulture, which are good for poverty allevia- 
tion, good for growth, and good for trade. 
Stability 
I have saved for last what will be the most difficult problem of 
the 1990s -- instability. Mote that instability has profound implica- 
tions for the poor and poverty alleviation, for environment, for 
trade, for the agricultural research system, and hence for the CGIAR 
system. 
The world has experienced rapidly increasing production instabi- 
lity in recent years. The coefficient of variation of total world 
cereal production rose from 2.8 to 3.4 percent between 1961-71 and 
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1974-81, an increase of 22 percent (Table 5). Most of that increase 
was accounted for by increasing variability in maize, barley, and some 
other cereals. On the other hand, it appears that sizable increases 
in wo.rld wheat and rice production were not accompanied by significant 
increases in instability. 
Increased production instability can be attributed in part to 
factors associated with modern seed/fertilizer technologies. For 
example, if all of a country's production of a crop has a single 
parent, its susceptibility to a particular disease outbreak may lead 
to widespread losses. An extreme example was the devastation to the 
United States' corn crop in 1970, caused by the southern corn leaf 
blight (Figure 1). In addition, policies affecting the availability 
of fertilizer, electricity, and water inputs increase in importance 
with the modernization of agriculture. Hence, instability in those 
policies can have a large and unfavorable effect on production 
stability. 
Increasing price instability has accompanied greater production 
instability between 1961-71 and 1974-81 (Table 6). The coefficients 
of variation for world prices for the two periods increased 400 
percent for wheat, 59 percent for rice, and 67 percent for maize. 
Many countries, however, have been able to insulate their domestic 
prices from fluctuations in world prices. Countries in the European 
Community have been particularly successful in that regard. 
In the face of increasing world production, the United States has 
historically increased its own stocks, limiting the potential decline 
in international prices (Figure 2). However, because of the market- 
competitive actions authorized in the 1985 Farm Bill, the level of 
carryover stocks of all major grains was reduced drastically. The 
recent drought has accelerated the drawing down of U.S. stockpiles, 
reducing their stabilizing influence on world markets, The U.S. 
Department of Agriculture estimates a 56 percent drop in U.S. cereal 
stocks from the end of 1987 to the end of 1988. 
The biggest losers from instability in food supplies and prices 
are, of course, the poor. A given reduction in supplies will result 
in a decrease in consumption by the bottom 20 percent of the income 
distribution in developing countries that is more than 10 times 
greater than by the top 5 percent. 
Dealing with instability by building stocks sufficient for a 
single poor year is not an extraordinarily expensive phenomena, and we 
find that cultivators around the world commonly do so. The difficult 
problem is the requirement for two bad years in a row. The cost of 
providing for that through stocking policy is exorbitant and, hence, 
is rarely paid. A second successive bad crop year is most effectively 
dealt with through international trade. For poor countries, special 
financing problems arise, which can effectively be dealt with through 
the IMF cereal facility. 
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Given the desire for trade and growth in food consumption in 
developing countries, the international system should prepare itself 
to meet those needs. To do so, the following is required: 
First, the international Monetary Fund cereal facility should be 
strengthened, rather than gradually weakened as it is at present. 
Second, it is important that the developed countries, as they try 
to restrain excessive growth in their production, keep in mind the 
growing need for food in developing countries during this intermediate 
period when agricultural growth is accelerating with technological 
change in developing countries but demand for food is growing even 
more rapidly. 
Third, the developed countries should consider at least a 
minimal-level stocking policy in order to stabilize their own prices 
and consumption and to provide some basis for stability in inter- 
national markets. 
Fourth, the CGIAR system must help increase stability and reduce 
environmental stress by breeding and developing practices for achiev- 
ing higher stability of production. 
Concl usi on 
I have spoken of five interacting forces that offer opportunities 
and problems in the 1990s. We can see that decade as putting us 
firmly on the path of eliminating the bulk of poverty and hunger in 
the world and, in so doing, see the seemingly relentless attacks on 
our environment abate. This is possible because of the vast invest- 
ment in human capital and institutional structures that has been 
occurring for the past several decades. The returns are beginning to 
flow -- first in the richer countries of Asia and Latin America, then 
in the poorer countries in these regions, and finally in Africa. 
The CGIAR System has a central role to play in these processes-- 
as a progenitor of research results, as a role model of research 
productivity, and as a partner in setting priorities. Those priori- 
ties must include achieving success in the easier portion of the task 
-- providing the base for an accelerated increase in resource produc- 
tivity (lower cost of production) in the high-population-density, 
high-production potential regions of the low-income countries where 
the poor are most numerous and most concentrated. They must also 
include efforts on the more difficult environments, efforts which are 
disproportionately larger than what poor countries feel they can 
afford on their own, a disproportion that is necessary, morally and 
economically, but that poses difficult problems of interaction with 
national systems. But the CG System must also recognize that the 
dynamics of the demand structure in developing countries changes 
rapidly with rising income and as the opportunity to earn large 
amounts of foreign exchange from nontraditional agricultural exports 
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grows. This calls for dynamic expansion and adjustment of the 
research system. 
Finally, the CG System is well placed to understand the critical 
problem of instability in global food production and prices, and from 
that understanding to convey the need to increase stability by 
scientific research, by appropriate rural investment opportunities, by 
increased incomes, and by international and national policies to both 
reduce instability and help poor countries to cope with instability. 
There is an exciting prospect just ahead of us. Those of you who 
have labored long and hard to provide growth, stability, and equity 
during this period of adjustment, distortion, and slow progress 
deserve to share in that vision. 
Thank you. 
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Table l--Growth in GNP and GNP per capita, developing countries, 1961 to 1983 (1983 = 100) 
Real GNP Per Capita GNP 
Compound Average Compound Average 
Annual Growth Annual Growth Annual Growth Annual Growth 
1961 to 1980 1981 to 1983 1961 to 1980 1981 to 1983 
. . . . . . . . . (percent) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (percent] . . . . . . . . . . . 
Asia 6.11 6.02 3.73 4.12 
(excl. China) 5.58 5.32 3.15 3.02 
North Africa/ 
Middle East 9.03 2.30 6.15 -0.34 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.76 -1.91 1.87 -4.84 
Latin America 6.12 -1.87 3.44 -4.11 
Developing Countries 6.60 1.93 4.09 -1.17 
(excl. China] 6.51 1.18 3.91 -0.15 
Source: World Bank (various years). 
Table 2--Projected incidence of undernutrition, 1990 
Total 
Low-Income Middle-Income 
Countries Countries 
Africa 
South Asia 
East Asia/Pacific 
Latin America 
Near East 
China 
. . . . . . . . (millions of people) . . . . . . . . 
137 99 38 
350 350 
31 31 
72 2 70 
34 4 30 
76 76 
Total 700 531 169 
Note: The estimated incidence of hunger in 1990 is calculated using 
the proportions undernourished in 1979-81 as reported by FAO 
(1985) and the projected population for 1990 as reported in 
World Bank (1988). The breakdown of the Near East into South 
Asia and East Asia/Pacific is on the basis of the distribution 
of poor in the two areas as given in World Bank (1986). 
Estimates on China are based on Riskin (1987). Division on the 
basis of low income and middle income is by the distribution of 
population in the two groups in each region. Incidence of 
poverty among low-income countries is assumed to be double that 
in the middle-income countries and this proportion is applied 
to each region specific number. Low-income countries are those 
with per capita income of $400 or less in 1983. Given the 
various assumptions in the calculations both in the original 
estimates and the projections, the numbers should be seen as 
indicative, and not definitive. 
Table 3--Changes in the prewalence of energy-deficient diets, 
1970 to 1980 
Percentage change in Percentage change 
share of population in number of people 
Developing Countries -2 
Low-Income 
Mi ddl e-Income 
+3 
-9 
Sub-Saharan Africa +4 
East Asia and Pacific -14 
South Asia +2 
Middle East and North Africa -14 
Latin America, Caribbean -4 
+14 
+54 
-44 
+49 
-57 
+47 
-68 
-21 
Source: World Bank (1986). 
Note: The norm used is a calorie level which the World Bank defines 
as the benchmark below which there is "not enough intake to 
prewent stunted growth and serious health risks." The FAO in 
the Fifth World Food Survey shows somewhat different trends in 
that the proportions of hungry people declined in all regions, 
though for the least developed countries as a group the 
proportions increased. It should be noted that not only is the 
FAO methodology different but their definitions of the regions 
are also not identical to the World Bank, e.g. the FAO does not 
separate out the poorer regions of South Asia from South East 
Asia aggregating them together as the Far East so that the 
disparate trends within the region are obscured. Nor do they 
separate out Sub-Saharan Africa from the North Africa. Since 
we are interested in separating out the economically different 
regions, we use the World Bank trends. China is not included 
in the analysis. 
Table 4--Rural-urban distribution of poverty and the estimated number 
of people living in areas of high potential, 1990 
Agricultural 
Potential 
Total Urban Rural High Low 
. . . . . . . . (millions of people) . . . . . . . 
Africa 137 14 1.23 61 62 
South Asia 350 70 280 140 140 
East Asia 31 5 26 6 20 
Latin America 72 29 43 11 32 
Near East 34 - - 
China 76 - 76 26 50 
Note: The distribution by rural and urban classification is based on 
a survey of country poverty studies. All poverty in China is 
grouped under rural poverty. There are indications that there 
is little malnutrition in urban areas but this should not be 
seen as a statement on the absence of poverty in urban China, 
rather a reflection on the paucity of definite data. All 
numbers are tentative and should be seen as merely indicative. 
Table 5--Changes in the coefficients of variation of world cereal 
production, 1960/61-1970/71 to 1971/72-1982/83a 
Cereal 
Coefficient of Variation of Production 
First Second 
Period Period Change 
Wheat 
Maize 
Rice 
Barley 
Millets 
Sorghum 
Oats 
Other cereals 
Total cereals 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . (percent) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
5.46 4.83 -11.5 
3.29 4.41 34.0 
3.97 3.80 -4.3 
4.81 7.50 55.9 
7.78 7.66 -1.5 
4.75 5.70 20.0 
11.30 5.35 -52.6 
4.57 9.33 104.2 
2.76 3.06 21.7 
Source: Hazel1 (1988). 
a Does not include China. 
Table 6--Changes in the coefficients of variation of world and 
national cereal prices,a 1961-71 to 1974-81 
Wheat Rice Maize 
1961-71 1974-81 1961-71 1974-81 1961-71 1974-81 
World 
France 
United States 
Mexico 
India 
Japan 
Canada 
Turkey 
F-R. Germany 
United Kingdom 
Italy 
Pakistan 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Yugoslavia 
Kenya 
Burma 
Philippines 
Colombia 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (percent) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
4.05 20.50 
3.02 2.41 
15.03 20.20 
2.92 5.47 
9.89 7.20 
3.37 8.39 
7.37 20.06 
2.67 25.48 
2.92 3.00 
2.68 4.78 
2.53 3.43 
7.84 8.11 
24.58 50.17 
17.76 28.16 7.37 
2.51 
2.56 20.29 7.98 
7.60 
22.36 11.10 
13.50 4.24 
23.15 
13.75 18.69 5.04 
18.07 
10.91 
2.54 0.66 
12.57 4.17 
14.05 9.32 
12.35 
4.27 
16.77 
10.03 
33.05 
26.07 
14.00 
10.00 
Source: Hazel1 (1988). 
a Variation represented by fluctuations in prices around trend for the 
periods indicated. 
Figure 1. U,S, Corn Yields, 1955-83~ 
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Wote: Downward fluctuations incorn yield in 1970 due primily to widespread corn blight, Since then, Most fluctuations can be attributed to severe weather 
conditions, 
Pigure 2, Respousiveness of U,S, and EC-12 Mhent and Coarse Grain Stacks toWorld Production, 1976/77 to iYBB/B9. 
Imillion metric tons) 
250 - - 148% 
268 -- 
----•-------- . . . . ..--___..... . =- 1850 ..---.- .. . . ..-..--1. ----- ......l..-- ------a ..____ -.-- . . .I--‘--- 1.1..  .- . ..---- . ..(I- 
B I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 I 1 I I I - l&R 
1976177 1979,80 1982RI3 1385,86 19 8849 
Source: USDll I198B), 
Note: Data for 19BlVB9 based on USDa projections a of llugust ii, 19BB. 
- World 
Product ion 
- - u, s* Stocks 
---- EC-12 Stocks 
